Faith Theological Seminary

1399 Old Testament Historiography, 1970

Dr. J. Robert Vannoy

 

Revelation andResearch:

A Study of

H. M. Kuitert, DoYou Understand What You Read?

and

J. W. Montgomery, WhereIs History Going?

 

Robert C. Newman

 

Introduction

 

The relationship between the Bible and the areas of historyand science has provoked much controversy for over a century.  Recently this question has been debatedwithin evangelical circles also. This paper attempts to discuss two recent and important works in thisfield, one by H. M. Kuitert and the other by John Warwick Montgomery.  For each book, I shall give an outlineof its contents, summarize its arguments, draw out some of its author'spropositions, and analyze them.  Inconcluding, I hope to give some propositions of my own which have arisen fromthis study.

 

Since I will refer to just a few different works, a shortedform of reference will be used. This will consist of a capital letter to identify the work, followed bynumbers to indicate the specific pages.[*]  These will be given in parentheses inthe text.

 

Kuitert, Do YouUnderstand What You Read?

 

The first book we wish to consider, by H. M. Kuitert of theFree University of the Netherlands, just appeared in English translation withinthe past year.  The title may seemsomewhat vague (it is actually a quotation from Acts 8:30), but this seems tobe in keeping with the style of the book itself.  Basically, the book is a popular treatment of Biblicalinterpretation.  As the authornotes in his Foreword, the method he uses in presenting his ideas is that ofdialogue with the reader, especially of raising questions for the reader toconsider.

 

Outline

 

We can sketch an outline of the book by listing its chaptertitles:

 

1. Understanding and Interpreting theBible

2. God Speaks and Is Spoken Of

3. The Time-Bound Bible and How toUnderstand It

4. The Time-Bound Bible and ItsAuthority

5. The Purpose of the Bible

6. Where Does the Purpose Begin andEnd?

7. Scripture Is Its Own Interpreter

8. The Bible and Science

9. Conclusion

 

Let us now look at Kuitert's presentation in some detail.

 

Summary

 

In chapter one, Kuitert states that most people feel weshould accept the Bible for what it says. This sounds like a good principle, he says, but in practice we all understandsome passages literally and some figuratively, and our real principle seems tobe to keep the interpretation we are accustomed to.  Next Kuitert asks whether all Bible commands are to beobeyed, and then he shows that many have been superseded.  Another question, "Are the Biblewriters concerned for historical precision?" is answered somewhatnegatively by citing examples from Kings, Chronicles and the Gospels.  Kuitert infers from this that thewriters are preaching, and that they have reshaped the details of their narratives to suit theirpurposes.  This conclusion, whichis gaining popularity in Reformed and Catholic circles, is not to be understoodas an attempt to undermine Biblical authority, says Kuitert.

 

The author then uses the story of the Ethiopian eunuch inActs 8 to extract four principles: (1) the Bible must be understood if it is to function; (2) the Biblemust be interpreted if it is to be understood; (3) the work of the Holy Spiritis being done in and through all that men do; and (4) the purpose of Scriptureis the proclamation of Jesus Christ. Concerning this last principle, Kuitert feels many people get involvedin contradictions, attempted harmonizations and legalism because they separateScripture from its single purpose.

 

In chapter two, Kuitert amplifies this last point.  Many people who fully accept the Biblemisunderstand it.  They do notrecognize this special character of the Bible, forget that it was written inHebrew and Greek, and have a tendency to want God to do things differently thanhe actually does.  We must realizethat the Bible uses time-bound language:

 

God came to be spoken of and spoken to,not in the language of some super-time (for no man knows such a language), butin a particular language of a particular time É  The time-bound Bible is not a regrettable concession; it isthe only kind of Bible men could have. It is necessarily bound to time; and this fact is a mark of itsauthenticity as a revelation of the covenant-partner God (K, 29).

 

This revelation of God is of Himself as a person and is notmerely propositions about himself. This does not mean that an interpreter may say anything about God and itbe true, but it does mean that God creates his image in our world through hispromises and acts:

 

É God breaks through our vagueness andour errors and show us His own recognizable "image" through His wordsof promise and His deeds of fulfillment (K, 30).

 

The problems of sin and calamity would make his imageambiguous, except that we have it unambiguously in Jesus, says Kuitert.  It is important that we recognize Godworking in our world today.  Hispast acts and promises in the Bible tells us what we may expect.  Yet because Paul's picture of the worldin his time is smaller in size than even that of children today, Kuitert feelswe must bring the works of God into "new and inventive expression"for today (K, 33).

 

Chapter three further discusses what Kuitert means bytime-bound.  The Bible writerslived in an entirely different culture than we do.  To understand them today, we must do more than just explaintheir figures of speech.  Theyactually took the firmamant to be a dome overhead, and they also believed in aliteral first couple, Adam and Eve. These ideas fit their time but not ours, says Kuitert.  Bible interpreters are alsotime-bound.  Thus Joshua 10 waslong understood to teach that the sun revolves around the earth; this is anexample of how an interpretation can become obsolete.

 

Now that we have new light on this question, continuesKuitert, we see that faith in Christ does not depend on the existence of Adam:

 

It is not Adam, not a theory about theBible, but the message of Jesus Christ that makes Christians of men.  That is why faith is not changed ifAdam is shown not to have been an historical person É (K, 40).

 

Thus Paul used the Rabbinical typological method in Romans5, treating Adam as a pedagogical example.

 

In chapter four, our response to this siutation isdiscussed.  If we continue to holdoutmoded interpretations, Kuitery feels that we risk the danger of a doublestandard of truth.  The last thingwe should do is attempt to harmonize, for the "best attempts in the worldwill not bring the first chapters of Genesis into harmony with the currentscientific understanding of the history of the world." (K, 46)  Such a bad attitude on our part willalso challenge the freedom of the Word of God and bind it to men and theirinfluence.

 

We must never demand more respect foran interpretation that comes from thepast than a Christian is allowed to give to the work of mere men (K, 48).

 

But how may we avoid the view that Scripture never speaks tous if we refuse to equate human interpretations with the Bible?  First, says Kuitert, we must subjectourselves to the authority of the Bible, not of men.  We must "not bind the Bible to any particular interpretation" (K, 50).  Instead of our certainty and confidencecoming from systematic theology or a certain theory about the Bible, it must:

 

É flow from trust, a trust that theSpirit of God shall lead the people of God into all truth, and that, therefore,the truth is held not by a few theologians or special laymen, but by all thechurch as the whole people of God (K, 50).

 

The single intention of Scripture is also vital:

 

If we separate the words of Scripturefrom the intention of Scripture, we will always bring readers of the Bibleunder the Law instead of under Grace (K, 51-52).

 

In chapter five, Kuitert emphasizes the importance makingour purpose in reading match the writer's purpose.  Taking the Reformed distinction on commandments:  some have historical authority (bindingat one time) and others normative authority (binding now), Kuitert applies thefirst category to the Biblical world-view(s) and physical view of man, claimingthat they are not binding because they do not related to the writers' intention(K, 56).

 

This raises the question of how we can find the Bible'sintention and be sure of it.  Wecould have all parts of the Bible to be authority, but this implies thateverything in the Bible is equally important and equally inspired.  Besides, "to accept everythingreported in the Bible as having actually happened, one must tamper with thetext" (K, 60).  Kuitert claimsthat such a view attempts to force a theory on the Bible that does not fit.  This undermines the real authority ofScripture, which rests on what it says, rather than what the Bible says restingon the bible's authority.  Thiswrong view of the Bible produces a wrong view of faith, says Kuitert, namelythat belief is a meritorious acceptance of a large number of propositions (themore the better) and that faith is made certain by an indisputable theory aboutthe nature of the Bible.  Instead,the proper order of faith is faith in Christ which leads to faith in the Bible(K, 63).

 

However, the proper way to read the Bible is not to acceptsome parts as time-bound and others as absolute.  There is "no possible way to separate the kernel fromthe shell" (K, 64).  Insteadwe read it as the saving message of God witnesing to his work in Jesus Christto give a word of promise for man and his world.  We can allow no otherpurpose than John 5:39 ("Search the scriptures; for in them ye think yehave eternal life: and they are they which testify of me.") if we are totalk of Biblical authority in the Bible's own way.  This prevents us from confusing its outdated ideas with itsmessage that these ideas were intended to convery (K, 64).

 

The church used this purpose in choosing the New Testamentcanon; it also annexed the Old Testament as a witness to Christ (K, 66).

 

In chapter six, Kuitert discusses the problem of the extentof the Bible's purpose.  Bultmannand Tillich both concentrate on the purpose outline by Kuitert above, but they"limit God's salvation and acts to what a man can experience, in his ownhumanity, of God today" (K, ).  They have not shown themethod to be wrong, in spite of their failure, according to Kuitert.  We must realize that no interpretationis guaranteed to be the right one, but we are responsible for our interpretationand have the promise of the Holy Spirit's guidance (K, 78).

 

In chapter seven, Kuitert says that Christian certainty iscertainty about the Bible's message. It is not obtained by arguments, but is created by faith (K, 82).  Nevertheless, it is true that forcertain things, faith would be empty if they had not occurred.  But "the Bible itself, in manyplaces, tells us it is not enough simply to say such and such happened becausethe Bible says so" (K, 82). The fact that the Bible reports certain events does not guarantee theyoccurred:

 

We do not insist that the resurrectionof Jesus really happened because the Bible says it did; we do not believe ithappened because the Bible tells us onlyabout things that really happened. Rather the resurrection is the historical turning point in human lifeand therefore is the center of the Bible, the authentic motive for the writingof the Bible, and the basis of our faith in the Bible (K, 82-83).

 

Thus the occurrence of the resurrection is cricuial toChristianity, but it is not endangered by investigation:

 

Historical research did not bring us tofaith; only the reading and preaching of the Scriptures did that.  Therefore, historical research cannever take away our faith, even though it does create difficult problems for us(K, 83).

 

As regards the interpretation of Scripture, says Kuitert, weunderstand that the Bible interprets itself in the sense that the Holy Spirituses the Bible as an instrument. It should not be understood as a static book, as Orthodox Protestantismdid.  If the Bible is separatedfrom the Spirit, the real Bible disappears.  We cannot master the Bible, because it shakes itself loosefrom all human attempts to control it. Yet the Bible gives us its own purpose as we read it.  As poor as the church's hermeneuticshave been, they have never completely hidden the Bible's purpose:

 

Looked at in its broad lines, the Bibleremains clear É  But the more weask about minor particulars, the more likely we are to discover differences (K,87).

 

This purpose is made clear by the bible, but it is not madeclear automatically; careful human study is necessary.  This work of interpretation is not tobe done individually, however:

 

É the understanding of the Bibleteaches the entire church and is, therefore safe only within the entirechurch.  This has an obviousecumenical significance.  We cannotwork as isolated church groups. When we carry on all by ourselves, the truth gradually becomes "ourtruth" (K, 90-91).

 

The leading of the Spirit is only promised to the church asa whole.

 

In chapter eight, Kuitert discusses the role of science inBiblical interpretation.  Too manyChristians fear science because of its appearance at the turn of the century,but this fear is no longer justified:

 

We ought to shed our distrust of thesciences partly because science has learned to control the tools through whichit attains its results (K, 95).

 

The "tools" spoken of here are not primarilyscientific instruments, but rather attitudes, methods and argumentation.  It regard to attitudes, Kuitert says:

 

Apart from certain streams withinMarxist scientific enterprises, such pretentious declarations of atheism are nolonger given a hearing.  Ascientific person is more likely to admit in all humility that while his instrumentsare equipped to measure ordinary things, something so unique as the existenceof God or the resurrection of Jesus falls outside the competence of hisinstruments (K, 96).

 

Kuitert suggests that this fear of science is often due toan overestimate of what it can do. Actually,

 

Science is nothing other than weourselves at work with refined instruments in the hope that with their help wecan find out more about reality than the naked eye can see (K, 98).

 

At the same time we must not underestimate science.  It forms an important part of ourculture which previously did not exist. 

 

Everyone uses science to interpret Scipture in some places(e.g., to detect a fable in Judges 9:8-15).  While man's understanding is darkened by sin, it is no moreso than the rest of him, including all his sensory faculties:

 

To refuse to make use of scientificfacts in our interpretations of the Bible because of the method by which theyare obtained makes no more sense and is no more responsible than to refuse touse our eyes to see things we would rather not see (K, 99).

 

Since science is from God as creator and preserver of theworld, we must use the facts of science in interpreting the Bible.

 

It takes some time before scientificdata really deserve the status of fact.  But when they have achieved that status, there is only oneresponsible thing to do with them and that is to make use of them and to takeaccount of them (K, 101).

 

According to Kuitert, these facts show that the firstchapters of Genesis are not literal or historical:

 

Whatever these chapters of the Bibleintend to tell us (and we said something about that in previous chapters), theydo not intend to teach us that the world is about six thousand years old, andthat in this young and complete world an original, human couple lived alone inthe garden of Eden (K, 101).

 

How then do we decide which Bible stories really happened?

 

Wemust decide.  The Bible is of sucha nature that it demands the service of men – of men who must considerand judge, make decisions, dare to make decisions, about what the Bible intendsand what it does not intend.  Thisapplies to the questions of how we can decide whether a given story in theBible is the story of something that actually happened or not (K, 102).

 

If we ask whether we are not throwing out parts of the Bibleand undermining its authority and trustworthiness, Kuitert answers thattrustworthiness is related to the intention of the Bible.  The real question is whether the Bibleis trustworthy as God's message of salvation:

 

While there are things whose historicalcharacter the Bible writers do not lay upon us, there are also things whosehistorical character is emphasized as the sine qua non of the faith. There is one story in the Bible, the story of Jesus' cross and resurrection,whose historical character forms the very heart of the Christianconfession.  The story is about anevent so unique that our world has known nothing like it before and has knownnothing like it since.  How couldwe ever obtain instruments to register this event scientifically? (K, 104).

 

In his concluding chapter, Kuitert stresses the importanceof what God is saying to us today. We cannot use atomic weapons even in extreme emergency.  Racism is wrong.  Divisions in the church are wrong.  Though we should be modest in claims inthis area, we must put ourselves under the rule of Scripture.  We cannot allow contradictory opionionsin these areas of interpretation to go on much longer if Christians are to bethe "salt of the world." To be "fruitfully engaged" with the Bible, we must beconcerned with what it is saying to us today.  We must renew emphasis on the social aspect rather than justthe individual aspect of Christianity.

 

Kuitert's Propositions

 

The following are a few propositions extracted from DoYou Understand What You Read? Which areimportant to his work and to the questions of the historical reliability of theBible and the relationship between faith and history.  It is on the basis of these propositions that I shalldiscuss Kuitert's book:

 

1. We should notwant God to do things different than he does.

2. God'srevelation consists of his words and deeds.

3. Scripture hasone purpose, to give God's message of salvation.

4. Aninterpretation is never better than the work of men.

5. Theinterpretation of the Bible is only safe within the entire church.

6. We must decide whether an event described in the Biblereally happened or not.

7. Thecosmology, cosmogony and origin of man given in the Bible are not normative,but reflections of ancient world views.

8. Historicalresearch did not bring faith; therefore it cannot take it away.

9. Thehistoricity of Adam is not relevant to our faith.

10. Thehistoricity of the resurrection isnecessary to our faith.

11. How could weever obtain instruments to register the resurrection scientifically?

 

Analysis

 

1. We should not want God to do things different than hedoes. Proposition one is an excellent one, which all Christians would do wellto heed.  We need to realize God'ssovereignty and goodness, and let him run the universe while we seek to do whathe has commanded us.  As Kuitertapplies the proposition, however, we must be careful to ask, "Is Kuitertright about how God has donethings?"

 

2. God's revelation consists of his words and deeds.  Propositiontwo is likewise a good one and shows that Kuitert's position is closer to theorthodox view of revelation than is that of G. Ernest Wright, for example, whorestricts God's revelation to his actions only.

 

3. Scripture has one purpose, to give God's message ofsalvation.  Proposition three sounds good at first, until one sees thatKuitert is not merely saying that this is the most important purpose ofScripture, but the purpose,virtually to the exclusion of all others. To this we must replay, "How do we know that John 5:39 gives thepurpose of Scripture to the exclusion of such an important one as indicated inRomans 9:22-23:

 

What if God, willing to show his wrath,and to make his power known, encured with much long-suffering the vessels ofwrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make know the riches of hisglory on the vessels of mercy, which he had before prepared unto glory É?

 

This proposition tends to limit the doctrinal content ofScripture to a small compass.

 

4. An interpretation is never better than the work ofmen. Proposition four sounds humble, but in fact it is skeptical.  An interpretation is better than thework of men when it matches the intention of God, the ultimate author ofScripture, just as one scientific theory is better than another when it betterfits the universe as it is. Reality must never by swallowed up by epistemology, certainly not amongthose who believe in a perspicuous revelation by the God who actually exists.  Like the previous proposition, this onealso tends to decrease the volume of Biblical revelation.

 

5. The interpretation of the Bible is only safe withinthe entire church.  Proposition five has some merit, buttwo crucial terms are vague.  Whatis meant by "safe" and what by "church"?  Kuitert's remark about the"ecumenical significance" of this principle (K, 90-91, page 6, above)suggests that the interpretation of the Bible is safe in a group including menwho are unsaved and openly heretical by Biblical standards.  If Kuitert is thinking of agreement ona "lowest common denominator" theory in this statement, the limitingnature of his hermeneutics becomes even stronger.

 

6. We must decide whether an event described in the Biblereally happened or not.  Proposition six makes the interpreterthe judge of the revelation.  Butthen it is no longer revelation, but either a pile of colored stones from whichone makes his own mosaic (Bultmann and Tillich) or a television picture whichcan be defocused to the degree of fuziness desired without changing the mainoutlines (Kuitert).  But even thislatter approach can be disastrous, if one is to believe Paul's letter to theGalatians, for the nature of salvation must in some points be drawn quitesharply.

 

7. The cosmology, cosmogony and origin of man given inthe Bible are not normative, but reflections of ancient world views.  In myopinion, proposition seven muddles the whole question of Bibicalhistoricity.  When one speaks ofnormative and non-normative commands, the adjective refers to obedience, not tobelieving the commands were actually giving.  It is dangerous to build doctrines on analogies of thissort, rather than specific Biblical statements.  A thoroough discussion of what the Bible actually teaches about cosmology, cosmogony and the origin of mangoes far beyond the scope of this paper. But I would strongly disagree that these teachings are merely ancientworld views adopted into the Bible.

 

8. Historical research did not bring faith; therefore itcannot take it away.  The first half of proposition eight istrue for most people, but the second half does not follow.  Try using this form of argument tosomeone who has been mugged in Central Park!  The mugger did not bring your money; therefore hecannot take it away. 

 

9. The historicity of Adam is not relevant to our faith. Proposition nine must be based on some particular view of man'scondition and God's salvation about which Kuitert does not elaborate.  But anyone who can dispense with thefall of man and his consequent nature (not created that way by God) surely hasa view of sin and salvation that is different from that of Scripture.

 

10. The historicity of the resurrection is necessary toour faith.  Proposition ten is true and clearly Scriptural.  It is essential a paraphrase of 1Corinthians 15:14.

 

11. How could we ever obtain instruments to register theresurrection scientifically?  Proposition eleven (actually aquestion, but with an implied answer) misses the point of the historicalverifiability of the resurrection. It is unnecessary to have some scientific instrument to observe the process of resurrection.  Verifying the antecendent state of death and the consequentstate of life is quite sufficient (and strongly urged as evidence in all sortsof Biblical miracles).  Unbelievershave understood this well enough, for they have usually sought to deny thedeath of Christ (Islam, or the swoon theory) or his resurrected state (stolenbody or merely hallucinations). Explanation of causation is not necessary to establish the occurrence ofan historical event.

 

Montgomery, WhereIs History Going?

 

The second book I wish to consider was written by JohnWarwick Montgomery, a professor at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, and itappeared in 1969.  Montgomery isbrilliant and yet lucid in his style. He writes from the position of one whose faith did come through anexamination of the evidence for Chrisianity and who feels it could be takenaway by historical research, were not Christianity true.

 

Outline

 

Again we can get a reasonable idea of the scope ofMontgomery's book by looking at the chapter titles:

 

1. Where is History Going?

2. Jesus Christ and History (1)

3. Jesus Christ and History (2)

4. The Christian Church inMcNiell's Rise of the West

5. Karl Barth and ContemporaryTheology of History

6. Tillich's Philosophy of History

7. Gordon Clark's HistoricalPhilosophy

8. Toward a Christian Philosophy ofHistory

 

Summary

 

Chapter one is a critique of recent attempts to give anoverall picture of and meaning for history.  Chapters two and three present an excellent historicalapologetic for the resurrection and deity of Christ, which is superior toMorison's Who Moved the Stone? as itdoes not pit the Gospels against one another or play down the miraculous.  Chapter four presents the historicalimportnce of Christianity in Western civilization by means of a critique ofMcNiell's recent work.  We willdiscuss chapters five and seven below, and chapter six is of the same sort.  Chapter eight gives Montgomery'sconclusions and a prescription for the preparation of a general history whichwould give the truth of Biblical revelation its proper place.  The appendices are valuable also.  I strongly commend Montgomery's book asan excellent contribution to historiography and the philosophy of history, aswell as to Christian apologetics.

 

In chapter five, Karl Barth's views on history arediscussed.  As regards total (orsecular) history, Barth sees only a monotony of human pride (M, 102).  This seems to be in strong reaction tothe optimistic worldview of the old liberalism in which Barth was trained (M,103-04), but it neglects the biblical teaching of God's providential directionof history for his purposes and his establishment of certain human institutionssuch as the family and the state (M, 105).  Barth's view of secular history is thus parallel to hisdoctrine of natural revelation; in both cases he would deny that we have anobjective Divine imprint which is only made apparent by revelation (M, 104-05).   

 

Barth does see significance in salvation history or Heilsgeschichte, but this type of history is somehow disjoint fromordinary events:

 

The entrance of sin into the worldthrough Adam is in no strict sense an historical or phychological happeningÉ  The sin which entered the worldthrough Adam is, like the righteousness manifested to the world in Christ,timeless and transcendental (M, 106).

 

To this it might be objected that Barth has attackedBultmann for denying the facticity of the resurrection, but Barth's oppositionto Bultmann is subjective and thus opposed to the idea of the objectivity ofthe gospel which so characterized the Reformation (M, 106-07).  This subjectivity of Barth is furtherseen in his emphasis on the "hiddenness" of revelation (M, 107,109-10).  Montgomery feels this emphasisis rooted in Barth's fear of an intellectual attack by"post-Christian" forces (M, 110):

 

Barth's fear of being unable to defendthe Christian revelation historically has thus led him to the point where,ostrich-like, he ignores the existence of unbelief and denies the ontologicalexistence of evil; he merely proclaims a "transhistorical" gospel tothose who – even though they deny it – are "believers"already (M, 111).

 

By this method, says Montgomery, Barth has succeeded inremoving Christianity from criticism and from the need of apologetics at thecost of abandoning the incarnation, the Biblical doctrine of sin and anymeaningful relation of the gospel to general human history.  As a result, Barth's Christianity is atimeless, unsupportable religion like Buddhism, Hinduism and their theosophicalcounterparts in the West (M, 111).

 

Barth's attitude toward history has now begun to makesubstantial inroads into evangelical circles.  Commenting on this, Montgomery says:

 

I think Ramm totally in error when hesays that "the reality of historical relevation does not put the Christianin a superior position to write the philosophy of history."  The Christian historian is in fact the only person who can write the philosophy of history, because only he has a revelationalperspective which is not conditioned by his own finite stance in history (M,113).

 

Montgomery indicates four points at which secularhistoriography has been stymied: (1) it is unable to reach a satisfactory anddefensible view of human nature; (2) it cannot determine levels of significanceamong historical events for lack of absolute standards; (3) it does not knowthe origin or goal of history, so it cannot give accurate patterns of totalhistory; (4) without regeneration there is no way to change the egocentricpersonality of the historian so that he can "put himself back in thepast" (M, 113).

 

Montgomery also quotes from an article by Ladd in Dialgo and says that he makes the same mistake asBarth.  That is, both make a"meta-historical category" for the resurrection "to preserve ittheological truth from historical criticism."  In stead of doing this, one should make a distinctionbetween historicism (positivism applied to history) and a truly empiricalhistorical method which does not exclude phenomena becase they are unique orcannot be linked causally (M, 115).

 

Since this chapter was previously printed in the Bulletinof the Evangelical Theological Society(May, 1963), Montgomery's remarks have provoked a reply from Ladd whichappeared later that year in the same journal.  The main thrust of Ladd's response "Faith andHistory" is that Montgomery is misusing the concept of Historie (L, 86). Ladd says:

 

Historie be definition is secular, unbelieving history É Historie is only that dimension of the past which conforms tothe presuppositions of and can be known by the techniques of modern secularhistoriography (L, 86-87).

 

Thus, according to Ladd, there is an unbelieving methodologyto which faith must be added:

 

É Faith provides a means of access toan area of objective reality which scientific historical criticism cannotapprehend.  Faith does not createits own object; faith is reposed in the objective Biblical Christ who meets usin the Gospels (L, 87).

 

Ladd then compares and contrasts Barth's and Bultmann'sdefinitions of Geshcichte (which theyboth contrast to Historie).  He then accepts Barth's definition ashis own (L, 90-91).  This view ischaracterized as follows:

 

It is sheer superstition to supposethat only things which are open to "historical" (historische) verification can have happened in time.  There may have been events which farmore certainly have actually happened in time than the kind of things thescientific historian can prove (L, 88).

 

How Barth's position here is consistent with that quotedabove on page 11 (M, 106) is not clear, but let us give him that benefit fewliberals are willing to give the Bible.

Montgomery's position appears to be that Barth, Ladd andothers should not be making the distinction which they do, and therefore heuses Historie in his own sense.  In chapter seven of Where IsHistory Going?, referring to Gordon Clark,Montgomery says:

 

One misses an analysis of theexceedingly unfortunate consequences attendant on Barth's use of MartinKŠhler's distinction between ordinary, verifiable historical events (Historie) and the "significant" and"historic" – but unverifiable – events of biblicalrevelation (Heilsgeschichte) (M,151).

 

Thus Montgomery is arguing against what he feels is a falsedefinition of historical method, such as the following one given by Bultmann:

 

The historical method includes thepresupposition that history is a unity in the sense of a closed continuum ofeffects in which individual events are connected by a succession of cause andeffect É  This closedness meansthat the continuum of historical happenings cannot be rent by the interferenceof supernatural, transcendant powers and that therefore there is no"miracle" in this sense of the word (L, 90).

 

On the contrary, Montgomery says:

 

Our responsibility is to make sure thatin the use of historical method, scientistic historicistic presuppositions Éare not smuggled into the picture disguised as objective historical method andallowed to determine the results of the investigation (M, 116).

 

In chapter seven of his book, Montgomery deals with GordonClark's philosophy of history.  Atthe kindness of Professor Clark, Montgomery had access to a work still inpreparation in 1968, so his discussion is quite up-to-date.  Clark has treated three important areasrelated to history:  the nature oftime, God and determinism, and epistemology.  It is the last of these, where Montgomery considers Clark'sview least adequate (M, 155), that we wish to consider here.

 

Gordon Clark is a presuppositionalist.  He rejects the possibility of anobjective treatment of data eithr in science or in history (M, 154).  The historical facts are so unable toconvey meaning by themselves that the historian cannot show why he concentrateson some facts and neglects others (M, 163).  Montgomery objects to this:

 

Why give the impression that no one,scientist or historian, Bultmannian or non-Bultmannian, can arrive at objectivetruth through direct investigation of data?  For Porf. Clark, one must accept this conclusion, troublesome though it may be in dealing with aBultmann, for only the prior acceptance of the "axiom of revelation"will yield factual truth in any sphere of knowledge (M, 155).

 

As a result, Clark favors the relativists in the philosophyof history as more convincing than the objectivists.  He is unwilling to accept the results of historical researchas objective true unless it can produce "absolute,""unalterable" results, like those in deductive logic (M,167-68).  Montgomery argues thatthere are two epistemological alternatives here:  we may have formal perfection (deductive certainty) with noempirical content to our knowledge, orwe made have empirical objectivity if we do not make impossible demands on themethod.  Against Clark, Montgomeryfeels we must take the latter alternative because Christianity is based onrevelation in history (M,168-69).

 

The conviction that historical facts docarry their interpretations (i.e., that the facts in themselves provideadequate criteria for choosing among variant interpretations of them) isessential both to Christian and to general historiography (M, 164).

 

Otherwise, one cannot show the inherent significance ofGospel history and is led to a subjectivism where the ultimate basis forfinding meaning in history is personal choice rather than facts (M,164-65).

 

Clark's view of doing history and science by imposing one'smetaphysical system on the data is wrong, according to Montgomery, which is notto say it is not commonly done. But crucial experiments and facts do distinguish between systems (M,169).

 

Furthermore Montgomery feels that Clark misunderstands thecausation issue.  Because it isimporrible to state a universal law of causation, Clark feels that objectivityis also unattainable.  But this isequivalent to requiring deductive proof. Causation is an empirical construct used to understand facts.  But although we do not understandlight, for example, we do accept its objective existence (M, 169-70).

 

According to Montgomery, the position and arguments of thehistorical relativistshave been demolished by analytical philosophers ofhistory.  Such men as J. W. N.Watkins have pointed out that all of the problems of bias present in historicalwork are also present in scientific research.  The objective nature of a theory does not depend on thebackground, temperament and presuppositions of its proponents, but on the criticizability of the theory itself (M, 171).  Watkins' remarks are not directed somuch at Clark, who puts bothhistory and science away as subjective, but it does suggest that critisim oftheory by use of evidence provides and objectivizing factor.

 

Montgomery seeks to show that Clark's view barely avoidssolipsism, and this only by his doctrine of the "internal witness of theSpirit," so that his position is finally that of fideism (M, 178).  Clark's "axiom ofrevelation," mentioned above, says that true objectivity is absent fromboth science and history and that only the Bible is undistorted.  But this axiom facts the dilemma thatthe Bible is a sensory and historical object.  Therefore it would be distorted by (subjective) science andhistory which we must use to study it. Therefore nothing is undistorted(M, 173-75).

 

Nash's attempt to avoid this problem by making the axiom ofrevelation an inductive hypothesis is certainly not acceptable to Clark in viewof his epistemology.  Nor isinternal consistency a sufficient condition for truth.  The most dangerous errors are thosewhich are internally consistent, but actually false.  Besides no man on earth knows enough to be able to showChristianity is consistent at all points (M, 176-77).

 

It is encouraging to note that Montgomery is not satisfiedwith tearing down other views of history, but he goes on to build what he feelsis the proper approach.  The reasonfor the failure of secular historians is not

 

in the inability of historical facts tospeak clearly apart from philosophical commitments.  The difficulty is rather, as I have noted elsewhere, that"such a welter of historical data exists that we do not know how to relateall the facts to each other.  Ourlifetime is too short and our perspective is too limited" (M, 165-66).

 

To construct a Christian philosophy of history, Montgomeryadmits the necessity of a prioris.  But these principles should bemethodological rather than substantive ("how to do research" ratherthan "what we must find"). The a prioris of theempirical method (not positivism) are unavoidably necessary to distinguishsynthetic truth from error (M, 178-79).

 

From these principles, Montgomery argues to the Christianclaims as follows:

 

1. The Gospelsare trustworthy historical documents on the basis of accepted textual andhistorical analysis.

2. In theGospels, Jesus claims to be God, and rests his claim on his predictedresurrection.

3. Theresurrection is described in detail in all the Gospels, evidencing his deity.

4. Theresurrection cannot be discounted a priori;to rule out the miraculous is to rule out proper historical investigation.

5. If Christ isGod, the he is right on the authority of the Old Testament and New Testament,on the purpose of his death and on the nature of man and history.

6. All Biblicalassertions bearing on the philosophy of history are thus revealed truth; allhuman attempts at historical interpretation may be judged in relation to thisrevelation M, 179).

 

George Mavrodes has argued against staements such as thelast above, claiming that Bible knowledge is no higher than any other kind, allbeing known by the same means.  ButMontgomery answers that the value of Biblical truth is not determined by theepistemological route by which it is obtained (M, 180-81).  It is just this fact that makes thecontent of Clark's theology so good when his epistemology is so bad, and whichallows even simple people ot be saved.

 

Montgomery's Propositions

 

1. A prioris are necessary, but they should involve method ratherthan content.  The aprioris of the empirical method areunavoidably necessary to distinguish synthetic truth from error.

2. A trulyempirical historical method does not exclude phenomena because they are uniqueor cannot be causally linked to other phenomena.

3. In bothscience and history, crucial experiments or facts do distinguish betweensystems.

4. Historicalfacts carry their interpretations; that is, the facts in themselves provideadequate criteria for choosing among variant interpretations of them.

5. Acceptance of#4 is essential to Christian and general historiography if subjectivism is tobe avoided.

6. The failureof secular historians to construct a philosophy of history is due to the massof data and their limited perspective.

7. The Bibleprovides the perspective necessary to write a universal history.

8. All Biblicalassertions bearing on history and science are revealed truth; all humanattempts at historical or scientific interpretation may be judged in relationto this revelation.

9. The value oftruth is not determined by the epistemological route by which it is reached.

 

Analysis

 

1. A prioris are necessary, but they should involvemethod rather than content.  The aprioris of the empirical method are unavoidably necessary to distinguishsynthetic truth from error.  Proposition one may sound heretical tosome presuppositionalists, but I believe one of the Bible's charges againstmankind is distorting theevidence to fit certain presuppositions (Romans 1:18, 21, 23, 35, 38).  Even Christians need to check theirviews continually against Biblical statements and against historical andscientific evidence.

 

2. A truly empirical historical method does not excludephenomena because they are unique or cannot be causally linked to otherphenomena. Proposition two is veryimportant in defining the empirical method.  The statement that miracles do not (or cannot) occur is acontent-type of a priori whichcharacterizes positivism.

 

3. In both science and history, crucial experiments orfacts do distinguish between systems.Proposition three is certainly true in the area of less basicpresuppositions.  The Biblicalstatements regarding the objectivity of natural revelation and the guilt of theJews in rejecting their Messiah indicate that this is true for the most basicpresuppositions also. 

 

4. Historical facts carry their interpretations; that is,the facts in themselves provide adequate criteria for choosing among variantinterpretations of them.  Proposition four is just an applicationof these to historical research. 

 

5. Acceptance of #4 is essential to Christian and generalhistoriography if subjectivism is to be avoided.  Proposition five followsfrom the foregoing propositions.

 

6. The failure of secular historians to construct aphilosophy of history is due to the mass of data and their limited perspective. Proposition six is based on the foregoing also.  The effect of sin is to influencemethodology and to influence the selection of data.

 

7. The Bible provides the perspective necessary to writea universal history.  Proposition seven is based onMontgomery's analysis of the reasons for the failure of secularhistorians.  It seems reasonable tome, but is beyond my competence.

 

8. All Biblical assertions bearing on history and scienceare revealed truth; all human attempts at historical or scientificinterpretation may be judged in relation to this revelation. Proposition eight is broadened from a specific statement by Montgomery,but it should be acceptable to him in view of other remarks he has made.  This proposition is admittedly widelydisputed in evangelical circles today, but the contrary view really reduces togiving alleged errors priority over the specific Biblical teaching.

 

9. The value of truth is not determined by theepistemological route by which it is reached.  Proposition nine follows from what maybe the only content a priori ofthe empirical method:  thereactually exists something to investigate.

 

Conclusions

 

To summarize my discussions of Kuitert and Montgomery, letme say that I feel only propositions 1, 2 and 10 of Kuitert are acceptablewithout considerable qualification. All of Montgomery's propositions seem valid to me. 

 

In addition, let me add the following propositions of myown:

 

1. Give God thebenefit of the doubt.  (We mighteven try this for men occasionally, as long as it does not put us in conflictwith God.)

2. Aninterpretation, whether in Biblical studies, history or science, may correspondto reality and therefore be better than the work of men.

3. Whenscientific intepretations reach the status of scientific facts, they should beused in Biblical interpretations. When Biblical interpretations reach the status of Biblical facts, theyshould be used in scientific interpretations.  The same can be said for historical and Biblical studies.

4. Biblical interpreters are time-bound.  Therefore it is possible that an interpretation may becomeobsolete.  It is poor methodologyto assume any given interpretation may be obsolete without specific evidence.

5. The Biblestates several purposes for its being written.  It is arbitrary to exclude any of these in attempting tounderstand the Bible.

6. The miraculousevents of the Old and New Testaments should be understood as historical in thesense of producing natural effects inspace-time which are detectable by historical research.

7. Thehistoricity of Adam is relevant to the origin of sin in the human race, whichis the reason that God's work of salvation is necessary for humans.

 



[*] H. M.Kuitert, Do You Understand What You Read?  Translated by Lewis B. Smedes.  Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans, 1970 (hereafter K); George E. Ladd, "Faithand History," Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society 6, no. 3 (1963) (hereafter L); John WarwickMontgomery, Where Is History Going?  Grand Rapids:  Zondervan, 1969 (heraefter M).