Some Problems for Theistic Evolution
Robert C. Newman
Biblical Theological Seminary
Interdisciplinary Biblical Research Institute
Hatfield, Pennsylvania
Most readers of PSCF are acquainted with the terms Òyoung-earth creation,Ó
Òold-earth creation,Ó and Òtheistic evolution.Ó[1] These reflect the fact that, among
Christians in general and within the ASA in particular, there is considerable
disagreement on how to relate the biblical and scientific data on origins. Some feel that theistic evolution is
not the best solution. Here I wish
to suggest why, examining some problems for theistic evolution, both scientific
and theological.
Before looking at these
problems, we will need to consider what theistic evolution is, and try to sort
it into its various versions.
After all, different forms of theistic evolution may face different
problems.
What is Theistic Evolution?
Keith Stewart Thomson has a
helpful discussion in The American Scientist entitled ÒThe Meanings of Evolution.Ó[2] Though he deals with evolution in
general rather than theistic evolution, much of what he has to say is
applicable. Thomson distinguishes
three different senses for the term Òevolution.Ó
ThomsonÕs Definitions of
Evolution
Pattern: Change over
time. The first is a Ògeneral sense of change over time.Ó[3] Stated so vaguely, this is nearly
worthless for defining evolution.
All but a few ancient Greek philosophers believe there has been change
over time. Even when Thomson
particularizes this to changes in Òthe qualitative and quantitative diversity
of organisms over space and time,Ó[4]
few views on origins would be excluded, except such varieties of young-earth
creation as deny any change at all since creation. However, some young-earth creationists have suggested very
large changes in animal diversity since the flood, e.g., deriving all cat-kinds
(lions, tigers, housecats, etc.) from a single pair on the Ark.[5] This requires changes at rates even
faster than the usual evolutionary models. Such young-earth creationists would thus be theistic
evolutionists indeed, though I doubt they accept the label.
In any case, Thomson couples
these changes in biotic diversity with Òa parallel set of data for changes in
the earth itselfÓ[6]
– the geologic record – the combination producing a pattern of
increasing diversity and complexity from the earliest fossils to the
present. So stated, evolution
parts company here with young-earth creationists, who see in the geologic
column mostly the record of a one-year flood rather than a large fraction of earthÕs
history.
But theistic evolution and
old-earth creation do not divide on this matter. Thomson notes that Òchange over time is the most solidly
based fact of evolutionÓ[7]
(based as it is on the mass of fossil evidence) but that this meaning Òincludes
no statement or inference about process.Ó[8] The divergence between theistic
evolution and old-earth creation, it seems to me, is basically over the process
God used to produce this diversity.
If we could observe the geologic record at a very high time-resolution,
it might be possible to see whether the more gradual transitions proposed by
theistic evolution or the more rapid ones of old-earth creation are supported
by the evidence. To the best of my
knowledge this is not yet possible, except as noted in our discussion of
transitional fossils below.
The divergence between
theistic evolution and ÒBlind WatchmakerÓ evolution is whether there is a God
behind the process. This is the
sort of distinction the intelligent design movement is seeking to detect.
Process: Descent
through common ancestry. ThomsonÕs second sense for the meaning
of evolution is that Òorganisms are related by descent through common
ancestry.Ó[9] No one (including young-earth
creationists) will deny that this is true for some organisms, but Thomson
intends this to mean that all
earthly organisms are so related.
He notes that this is a hypothesis which logically follows from Òthe
twin premises that [1] life arose only once on earth and that [2] all life
proceeds from preexisting life.Ó[10]
But this second sense is a
bit problematic. There are those
who call themselves evolutionists, even in a non-theistic sense, who would not
agree with common descent. For evolutionists who believe in an extra-terrestrial
origin of life, there is no compelling reason why all of it reaching earth need
have come from the same source.[11] And even evolutionists who believe that
all terrestrial life got its start on earth need not insist that life arose
here only once.[12] Thus meaning two divides even non-theistic
evolutionists, though the majority is currently in favor of common descent.
If non-theistic evolutionists
can believe that modern life derived from a few simple life forms rather than
one, then theistic evolutionists need not postulate a single source either
– other than God, the ultimate source – though it seems nearly all
of them do. Though nearly all
old-earth creationists postulate at least two independent creations (original
life and mankind), one could still be an old-earth creationist while having all
life descended from one original form.
Here, too, it looks like it is the mechanism that distinguishes theistic
evolution from old-earth creation, though that, too, may have some kinks we
need to investigate.
Mechanism: Natural
Selection. The third sense Thomson proposes for
evolution is Darwinism, or natural selection, Òa model of random variation and
differential survival.Ó[13] It is here that theistic evolutionists
and old-earth creationists take different paths. But the situation is more complicated than a simple
bifurcation. For one thing, nearly
all theistic models of origins (including special creation) admit some measure
of natural selection. This is
typically limited to microevolution by young-earth and old-earth creationists,
so we might say that the real divide is over whether random variation and
differential survival is the sole
mechanism to explain the diversity of life on earth, with theistic
evolutionists saying yes and special creationists saying no. But random
variation and differential survival have nothing to work upon until one has a
self-replicating automaton, whether this be a cell or a molecular system. So what is the mechanism to get from
simple organics to a self-replicating system? Probably various theistic evolutionists will opt for
different answers here.
And what are we to make of
ÒrandomÓ variation? This will
split the non-theistic evolutionists from the theists. But as Keith Miller and David Wilcox
suggest in their Statement on Creation (below), this will also split the
theistic evolutionists into a number of groups, depending on how one defines
Òrandom.Ó And how one defines
random may also have some bearing on whether one would expect to see empirical
evidence which would distinguish theistic from non-theistic evolution. Has God so hidden himself that humans
could not detect his activity anywhere in the history of life on earth, not
even by statistical means?
ASA Creation Statement
Consider
next the statement on theistic evolution composed by Keith Miller and David
Wilcox for the Creation Statement Subcommittee of the ASA Commission on
Creation. Neither their statement,
nor the larger whole of which it is a part, was intended to bind the ASA or
officially reflect the exact diversity of views therein. The larger statement was designed to be
a consensus of the views of the subcommittee, which was itself selected to
reflect something of the diversity in the ASA. The individual statements on various views of creation were
composed by one or more proponents of the particular view involved. So this statement is that of Keith and
David, but they attempt to reflect such diversity within theistic evolution of
which they were aware. I have
added the letters A, B and C to three of the headings to facilitate reference
to specific points. The statement
is given here as a sidebar.
Statement on Creation:
Theistic Evolution (Continuous Creation, Evolutionary Creation) View
Theological Statements:
A. In addition to the theological commitments affirmed by all parties, ASA members who accept an evolutionary* perspective, would affirm the following:
1. God is free to act in creation in any way consistent with His character. The nature of the physical universe and of God's interaction is a consequence of God's free choice.
2. Evolutionary processes* are not antithetical to God's creative action. Furthermore, nothing in scripture provides a theological basis for rejecting the descent of all living beings from a common ancestor, including humans.
3. An evolutionary* view of the history of life provides a positive, productive context for understanding God's relationship to creation, and our role as His image bearers. It also provides a fruitful context for considering the meaning and implications of Christology and the cross.
4. Christians should rejoice and praise God for each new revelation of the history and character of the creation, for each new discovery that fills previous gaps in our scientific understanding.
B. Areas of theological diversity among Christians holding an evolutionary* view:
1. How does God direct the creation to His desired ends? Various models for God's action have been proposed, of which some follow. These are not mutually exclusive, so individuals may hold more than one.
a. God is actively directing ALL natural processes ALL the time so that all physical events are specifically willed by Him.
b. God gave, and continues to give, being to a creation gifted with all the capabilities to bring forth all the forms, processes, and events, willed by Him.
c. Creation responds to God's will as our bodies respond to ours. However, God's being is not embodied in creation but is transcendent over it.
d. God acts to determine the inherent indeterminacies of physical events, at the micro level of quantum phenomena and at the macro level of chaotic systems. The physical universe is not deterministic, but rather is an inherently open causal system.
2. To what extent has God granted freedom to His creatures? Various suggestions have been proposed:
a. God has chosen to limit His direct control over some aspects of creation to give His creatures genuine freedom.
b. God allows for a certain level of genuine indeterminacy in creation such that specific outcomes are not predetermined. At the same time, He remains sovereign and the fulfillment of His will is assured.
c. All physical events are predetermined and preknown by God.
C. Scientific Statements:
1. An ancient and dynamically changing Earth and universe is supported by overwhelming evidence from geology, physics, astronomy, and cosmology.
2. The common descent of all living things is well‑supported by diverse lines of evidence in geology, paleontology, biology, and genetics.
3. Biological evolution* has great explanatory power and has proven effective in generating new and testable hypotheses in a wide range of scientific disciplines including historical geology, paleontology, ecology, biogeography, developmental biology, biochemistry, and genetics.
4. New discoveries and new models are progressively closing many previous gaps in our knowledge and understanding of evolutionary history and mechanisms.* While many unanswered questions remain, current research is raising many exciting possibilities for studying previously intractable problems.
___________
*The various references to evolution herein are understood to include the full range of scientific models from the adaptive change of species populations to the diversification of life on Earth from its common origin, but to exclude the idea of autonomous nature assumed in the ABlind Watchmaker@ hypothesis.
A few comments on the
Miller-Wilcox statement. Under
theological statements that all theistic evolutionists agree on, both young-
and old-earth creationists would also agree with A1 (GodÕs freedom) and A4
(rejoicing in GodÕs revelation in nature), and many – myself included – with A2a
(evolution not antithetical to God being Creator) also. We will respond to A2b (nothing in
Scripture forbidding evolution) later on.
A3 will be true only if theistic evolution is correct.
Among the theological
statements where theistic evolutionists disagree, item B1 deals with
mechanism. Of the four
alternatives listed, it would appear that only B1b (fully-gifted creation) is
likely to be testable scientifically.
Item B2 deals with GodÕs will in relation to creaturely freedom, and the
various sub-items correspond roughly to the Arminian (B2a), Openness (B2b) and
Calvinistic (B2c) models.
Among the scientific
statements, C1 (ancient, changing earth and universe) is also accepted by
old-earth creationists. C2 opts to
limit the descent of living things (on earth, at least) to a single common
ancestor, which, while rather characteristic, does not seem to be necessary to
theistic evolution. Regarding C3,
a model may have great explanatory power and be effective in generating
hypotheses, yet not be the whole story.
Atheistic evolutionists make a similar claim over against theistic
evolution. C4 leads us into the
question of filling gaps, which we will examine by and by.
Having now spent some time
thinking about varieties of theistic evolution, letÕs see if we can put
together a general definition:
Theistic
evolution is a view of origins in
which God used providential means such as mutation and natural selection as the
prime or only means for producing the diversity of living things on earth.
Some varieties of theistic
evolution would include diversity on the matters of (1) whether original life
was created miraculously or providentially, (2) whether there were one or more
distinct forms of original life, and (3) whether or not there really was an
original pair of humans, Adam and Eve.
By contrast, we can then
suggest a parallel definition of special creation as follows:
Special
creation is a view of origins in which
God used miraculous intervention as the prime or only means for producing the
diversity of living things on earth.
Whether or not one likes
these definitions, they permit us to view theistic origin models as a kind of
spectrum, with the extreme views using only the one means and the moderate
views using the relevant means as the prime means. Most views held by various Christians will fall
somewhere between the two extremes.
Another approach would be to
define theistic evolution and special creation so that they are not mutually
exclusive. For instance:
Theistic
evolution is a view of origins in
which God used providential means such as mutation and natural selection as a
means for producing the diversity of living things on earth.
Special
creation is a view of origins in
which God used miraculous intervention as a means for producing the diversity
of living things on earth.
In this case the extreme positions would be Òpure theistic evolutionÓ and Òpure special creationÓ and the intermediate positions would involve a mixture of the two means.
Let us begin with scientific problems that face theistic evolution. Being a theist myself, I do not find any insuperable problem with the idea that God might be behind the various phenomena studied under evolution. I will not here attempt to deal with problems which atheists would bring against the view. These are often (but not always) the same as those an atheist would urge against theism in general, and they are largely philosophical and theological in nature. Instead, I want to look at items we could call scientific that are problematic for one or another of the various forms of theistic evolution over against forms of special creation. Or, using our alternative definitions, problems for more providential forms of theistic evolution over against more miraculous ones.
The first problem is that of
the relative scarcity of fossils that can reasonably be considered intermediate
or transitional between the major categories of the biological classification
system.
In any model in which there
has been the sort of change over time that we call descent through common
ancestry, one would expect numerous transitions between the earlier forms of
living things and the currently existing ones. DarwinÕs original model proposed that the changes which
occur are very small, necessitating many intermediate steps between organisms
which are even moderately different.
Employing the idea of natural selection, Darwin suggested that the
intermediates would eventually be eliminated through competition with their
descendants (and surviving ancestor-forms), so that by later times large gaps
would have developed between the various kinds of living organisms. But the fossil ensemble itself, being a
record of this history of life, should be nearly continuous through time.
Darwin was aware that the
fossil sequence was not continuous.
His solution to this problem was to suggest that the fossil record is
very fragmentary. There is
obviously some sense in which this is true. At least for land-based life, only a tiny fraction of the
organisms which once lived get preserved by fossilization. On the other hand, marine life,
particularly those sorts having hard body parts not soluble in water, would
presumably leave a pretty complete record. But in any case, the actual fossils that do survive do not
appear to be an imperfect record of the sort of gradual process Darwin envisioned.
This actual fossil record was
apparently one of the reasons driving a shift from the original model of Darwin
¾ in which all
populations are slowly evolving ¾ to the view found in neo-Darwinism, that really
significant changes take place only in small, isolated population groups. Here the isolation can help avoid a new
mutation being swamped by the old version. The small size of the population makes it more likely that a
statistical fluke may help an innovation gain ascendancy in the population. So far, so good. The real problem comes when one
considers a change that will take many mutations to accomplish. The chance of getting a second (third,
forth É) good mutation in this small population is nil compared to getting it
in the original large population, so one must wait until the small population
has grown and spread to become really big before there is any real chance of
taking the next step. For the
higher categories in the biological classification scheme, the separations
between categories are hundreds or thousands of mutations, so we should have
hundreds or thousands of large intermediate populations which are nearly as
capable of leaving fossils as their ancestors and descendants. This we donÕt see, and it is a
scientific problem for all forms of gradualistic evolution, whether theistic or
not.
Partly as a result of this
problem, Gould and Eldridge proposed a version of evolution they call
punctuated equilibrium. In this
model, the transition from one form to another is quite rapid ¾ ÒpunctuatedÓ ¾ to account for the sudden appearance of new forms in
the fossil record. Among these new
forms, the ones which survive to produce evidence in the fossil record are
those in equilibrium (internally and externally) so that they do not tend to
change, producing the observed phenomenon called Òstasis.Ó
The problem facing the
punctuated equilibrium view is similar to that facing evolution by large
mutations ¾ the chance of getting something functional is astronomically
minuscule. This model, however,
could work rather well as a form of theistic evolution. It does fit the fossil record. A mind guiding the process could easily
produce results one would never expect in a mindless universe. I commend this alternative to those who
are theistic evolutionists, though I am not inclined to call it theistic
evolution myself. In any case,
this is something that should easily be distinguishable empirically
(statistically) from atheistic evolution, and the arguments of Gould and
Eldridge (and earlier, Goldschmidt) suggest that it is.
For versions of theistic
evolution that have God using random processes, the problem remains. The only way of crossing from one
viable form to another (that are, say, 10 mutations apart) is by means of a
random walk. A random walk is a
process by which an object moves through space randomly, taking steps of either
fixed or variable length in random directions. The illustration popularized by George Gamow is that of a
drunk trying to find his way home.[14] Starting from a convenient lamppost, he
takes a step in a random direction.
His next step is in another random direction. The question is, how far from the lamppost would the drunk
be expected to be after N steps?
If the average (or root mean square) length of the drunkÕs step is L,
then his expected distance from the lamppost will be D = LxSQRT(N). This same result holds for movement in
any number of dimensions, for distances are still measured using an extension
of PythagorasÕ theorem.
Let us assume for simplicity
that all the mutations are the same length L. To cross a distance equivalent to the length of 10
mutations, D = 10L. Then SQRT(N) =
10 and N = 100, so it will take 100 mutation steps on average to move this
distance. One can immediately see
that it takes much longer to cross a gap by random walk than by a guided walk.
Applying random walk to
evolutionary changes, the space in which the movement takes place is not the
drunkÕs two-dimensional sidewalk nor our physical three-dimensional space, but
some multi-dimensional phase space of functional characteristics. In a one-dimensional space, movement is
along a straight line, so that after the 100 random steps one is on average
about 10 steps from the start, but this may either be in the right direction or
the wrong direction for the needed transition. Thus there is only one chance in two that 100 steps will
cross the gap. For a
two-dimensional phase space, the problem is much worse ¾ in fact, insuperable if we imagine the target is a
point. Expanding the target to a
circle (say, 1 mutation is radius), there is less than one chance in thirty
that 100 steps will take us to the right destination. For a three-dimensional phase space, the chance drops to
less than one chance in 400, and thereafter the chances decrease approximately
by a power of ten for each added dimension. Random walk is not a very efficient way to get from one
place to another! More to the
point, it must leave an enormous number of transitional fossils behind. These we donÕt see in the fossil
record.
Michael Behe, in his book DarwinÕs
Black Box, has popularized the phrase
Òirreducible complexity.Ó[15] By this he means that living things
contain numerous organs, structures, processes and reactions which have
component parts that appear to be useless unless all are present together. If one part is missing, the function is
gone.
BeheÕs illustration is the
traditional mouse trap, which consists of a wooden platform to hold the parts,
the hammer to get the mouse, the spring to drive the hammer, the arm to hold
back the hammer, the trigger to release the arm and hammer, and various staples
to attach the parts to the platform.
If any of these parts is missing, the device wonÕt catch mice. Some sort of bait (cheese, bacon,
peanut butter) is also desirable if one wishes to catch mice without waiting
for them to blunder into the trigger by chance, but this is not absolutely
necessary and so is not a part of the mouse trapÕs irreducible complexity.
Behe suggests that a similar
phenomenon is found in living organisms.
He gives as examples the rotary motor that the drives the flagellum in
the E. coli bacterium, the
chemical processes that initiate vision and blood clotting, and the intracell
transport system. BeheÕs point is
that such systems apparently have no survival value until the whole has been
assembled, and thus a series of coordinated mutations is needed to produce any
such structures, the sort of thing that random processes are notoriously
unlikely to provide. It is, of
course, possible to claim that each needed intermediate step must have some survival value, we just donÕt know what it
is. That is possible. It is also a
form of the ÒGod of the gapsÓ argument.
It is equally possible that all junk DNA has some function which we
havenÕt found yet, or that all vestigial organs have some current function so
that they are not really vestigial.
We shall return to this question by and by when we discuss the ÒGod of
the gaps.Ó In any case, this
phenomenon of irreducible complexity is explained more easily, it seems to me,
by a sudden intervention to assemble such structures, or by the sort of guided
providence that would (again) show up empirically under thorough
investigation. Thus, irreducible
complexity points to a more likely explanation by some sort of old-earth creationism
or a theistic evolution that leaves tracks.
A third type of scientific
problem for theistic evolution is what we might call the ÒshapeÓ of the fossil
record. Darwinian evolution (and
indeed, the neo-Darwinian and punctuated equilibrium versions also) builds
diversity progressively. One
begins with small diversity, and large diversity arises late in the
process. Thus an original life
form consists of a single type, which over time gradually diversifies until its
various varieties become distinct species, some of these species diverge enough
to become separate genera, some of the genera diversify to families, and so on,
up to the level of phyla. The
result should be that the various phyla are the last categories to be formed in
the history of life. Without
getting into nitpicking over the exact definition of the various levels in the
biological classification system, in the Darwinian scheme life should form a
sort of single tree.
As a matter of fact, the
fossil record pictures life as something like a large series of bushes, with
the major body plans for the animals all being formed in the brief period known
as the Cambrian Explosion. This,
again, looks much more like some sort of intervention (or at least rapid, guided
evolution) than it does like a slow, random process of small mutations.
What is natural law? Nobody knows, at least no one down here
on earth. For atheists (secular
humanists, naturalists, materialists), it must be some sort of structure that
allows the universe to have organization, but the existence of which is finally
inexplicable. For theists, two
suggestions have been made. (1) It
is the way God normally acts, and has no real separate existence of its
own. (2) It is some sort of
created structure, to which God has given certain capabilities.
Do we as Christians know
which of these theistic alternatives is correct? I donÕt think so.
How would we decide? I know
of no way from within the universe that we could do any experiment to make a
choice between the two. The answer
is thus going to be obtained from some sort of philosophical or theological
argument, from some biblical hints, or from eschatological verification. My own inclination is that (2) is
correct.
Actually, it doesnÕt matter
for our concern. The Bible and
theology (and philosophy) still distinguish between GodÕs providential activity
and his miraculous activity, whether GodÕs providential actions are mediated
through a created natural law structure or not. The Bible uses the distinctive Greek terms dunamis,
thauma, semeion, and teras in the New Testament, and similar terms in Old
Testament Hebrew, to designate miraculous events. They are thus seen as Òpowerful, amazing, significantÓ or
ÒwondrousÓ over against normal events which, while under GodÕs control, do not
carry their significance on their sleeve, so to speak.
Much of our debate between
old-earth creation and theistic evolution (and even among the various versions
of theistic evolution) revolves around the question of distinguishing
providential from miraculous events; and more particularly, of inferring the
one or the other for events at which no human observer was present. Though perhaps not all miracles could
be characterized by discontinuity, this seems to me to be one rather
distinctive marker that separates most providential events from most miraculous
ones. Though God turns water into
wine every summer, to do so in a few moments in a stone jar without the aid of
a grapevine is pretty discontinuous in some sense.
Now science studies the
structures and events in nature in an attempt to discover natural laws which
govern these phenomena. Natural
events will presumably operate continuously on some scale, so that a scientist
tends to fill all gaps with interpolations which are as smooth as possible. But
actual observations are discontinuous, a series of discrete dips into the
stream of nature. How do we tell
when we have correctly or incorrectly filled a gap in the data, whether by
postulating the correct continuity or the actual miracle which has occurred, or
by mistakenly postulating a continuity (or a wrong continuity) or a miracle
when none has occurred?
Every human being is
constantly filling gaps in his or her experience, either with natural
explanations or with miracles ¾ with a God of the gaps or with a natural law of the
gaps. Only those who postulate
that miracles donÕt occur can be sure that a natural law explanation is the
right one. And only those who deny
natural phenomena can be certain that a miracle is the right explanation,
though I seriously doubt anyone holds this view.
I believe we are correct in
seeing miracles as much rarer phenomena than providential events. It does not follow that the right
methodology (a la Hume) is to go with providence in every case. Nor, I think, should we flip a coin, or
spin a pointer whose dial is weighted to what we think is the relative
likelihood of providence and miracle.
Instead we look for clues that point to the one or the other, or (more
likely) treat providence as the default explanation in the absence of markers
for the miraculous. What are these
markers for the miraculous? I
think the biblical terms for miracle give us some insight. Events which are sufficiently powerful,
amazing, significant or wondrous are presumably miraculous. The stinger is Òsufficiently.Ó How powerful, amazing, significant or
wondrous need an event be to qualify?
The work of Bill Dembski and Mike Behe is helpful here.[16] If the event is powerful, amazing,
significant or wondrous enough that a miraculous intervention looks like a
better explanation than does a natural phenomenon, then thatÕs the way we
should go. Our methodology should
be inference to the best explanation
rather than simply using a fixed rule to plug gaps.
We turn now to theological
problems facing theistic evolution, under which we include exegetical and
hermeneutical problems.
It seems to me that Genesis 1
(understood from an old-earth perspective) presents no problems for some sort
of theistic evolution of living things.
The land produces vegetation, the waters teem with living creatures, the
birds fly in the sky, the land produces living creatures ¾ all in response to GodÕs command ¾ without any indication of how quickly they respond or
whether any mediation was employed.
Obviously, if Genesis 1 is understood from a young-earth perspective, it
presents a formidable problem for theistic evolution.
The King James translation
Òafter their kindÓ has regularly been taken to indicate fixity of species (or
at least of created kind). But the
word ÒafterÓ in this context is probably an archaic English usage, meaning
Òaccording to,Ó as indicated by the use of the phrase elsewhere in the
Bible. In any case, the
corresponding Hebrew phrase lemin has no temporal connotation. Thus God made the various kinds of
plants and animals, but the Bible says nothing about whether they reproduce after their kind.
The situation is different in
Genesis chapter two. On the face
of it, the chapter narrates the creation of Adam by a miraculous rather than a
providential process. Adam is
ÒformedÓ from Òthe dust of the ground,Ó God Òbreathed into his nostrils the
breath of life,Ó and as a result Òthe man became a living being.Ó
The idea proposed by some
theistic evolutionists ¾ that God made man by putting a human soul into an ape
¾ has often been
argued from the traditional King James translation of nephesh hayah as living soul.
So God put a living soul into this creature he had made and he thus
became human. But this
interpretation is not favored by the use of this phrase in the previous
chapter, where it is applied to the other animals and is translated variously
as Òliving creature,Ó Òliving thing,Ó or Òbreath of life.Ó It seems that nephesh represents a breathing being, and hayah is the usual adjective for Òliving,Ó so that Adam
becomes a living, breathing being.
The implication is that Adam was not alive before this happened, even
though his body had already been formed.
The creation of Eve in
Genesis 2 is clearly narrated as subsequent to that of Adam, after he had named
the animals and come to realize that he had no mate like they did. God puts Adam to sleep, takes one of
his ribs (or a part of his side), and makes the woman from that, a sort of
clone with some significant differences.
Again, the natural reading indicates an interventionist rather than
providential event.
The fall of mankind into sin in Genesis chapter three likewise seems problematic for at least some versions of theistic evolution. The event is narrated as though it were a specific historical event, involving two human individuals who make specific successive choices to disobey God ¾ the woman following the (implied) advice of the serpent, and the main accepting the fruit offered by his wife. The event is followed by real consequences for the snake, the woman and the man, which are apparently to be passed on to their descendants.
I see no problems in Genesis
2 and 3 for those versions of theistic evolution in which Adam and Eve are
separate special creations not descended from any pre-existing life. I would probably call these views
old-earth creation myself, but defer to the label which their proponents wish
to use. For other versions in
which Adam is descended from apes but is still a real special creation, the only
problem is the remark in Gen 2:7 about Adam becoming a living being. This has been handled by Glenn Morton
in a satisfactory (though rather quirky) way by suggesting that Adam was a
non-viable mutation of an ape that consequently died but God brought to life
again.[17] All these views come under the category
I call ÒAdam-typeÓ theistic evolution.
I see no large exegetical or theological problems here.
On the other hand, I do see
serious problems with Òno AdamÓ theistic evolution. In these versions, there never is a single pair who are the
first humans. Instead a whole
population of anthropoid apes gradually develops into humans over the course of
many thousands of years. In such a
case, the narratives of Genesis 2 and 3 cannot be historical, in contradiction
to the natural reading of the many references to Adam, Eve and the fall that
occur elsewhere in Scripture.
Rather the accounts in Genesis are mythical or parabolic in some sense ¾ a simplified way of conveying some information to the
original readers which we must now recast in the light of modern scientific
findings. This approach seems to
involve greatly reshaping the nature of the fall of mankind into sin and
rebellion, with consequent influence on the nature of redemption and the
atoning work of Christ. These are
theological problems with a vengeance.
Let us move on to consider
hermeneutical questions. What is
the genre of Genesis 2 and 3? For
the various forms of special creation (whether young or old earth), these
chapters are fairly straightforward historical narratives, which thus form a
continuum with the remaining chapters of Genesis. They doubtless contain figurative language. Presumably there is anthropomorphism
here and there, probably ÒformedÓ (2:7), ÒbreathedÓ (2:7), ÒplantedÓ (2:8),
perhaps even ÒsaidÓ and ÒsawÓ (throughout chapter 1) and ÒrestedÓ (2:2). There is, after all, really quite a lot
about God we donÕt know.
For the various forms of
ÒAdam-typeÓ theistic evolution these chapters are likewise historical
narratives, but Òformed from the dustÓ (2:7) is taken as a condensed and
concrete expression for a long process of evolution.
The term ÒmythÓ has a rather
wide range of meaning, but common to all of these is the idea that the event
narrated never actually happened.
Bible believers are rightly unhappy with this characterization of
biblical narratives, though examples in Scripture have been suggested that
might fall into this category.
More below when we discuss parable or allegory. One perennial problem is that ancient
pagan religions made extensive use of myth, and both Christians and Jews wished
to distance themselves from the idolatry and immoralities of these religions. A major recent problem is that liberal
versions of Christianity which employ the category of myth as a genre found in
the Bible regularly wind up (de)mythologizing significant teachings of the
Scripture, as do Rudolf Bultmann, for example, and the more recent Jesus
Seminar.
There is probably little
sense in trying to distinguish parable from allegory in Scripture. The distinction is a standard one in
modern literature, but the Hebrew term mashal and its Greek translation parabole included both.
So, is there any narrative in Scripture that looks something like what
no-Adam theistic evolutionists envision for Genesis 2 and 3? Yes, there is something similar in
Ezekiel 16. LetÕs have a look at
it.
The passage is a parable or
allegory for the relation between Jerusalem and God. JerusalemÕs history is parabolically narrated as the story
of a girl from her birth through much of her adulthood. God is pictured as a man who adopts and
marries her. Some of the
significant features of the narrative are:
á
The childÕs parents are
mentioned (16:3, 44-45).
á
She is abandoned at
birth (16:4-5).
á
God rescues her,
allowing her to survive to maturity (16:6-8).
á
She is adopted by God,
married to him and cleaned up (16:8-9).
á
God gives her many gifts
of the sort appropriate for a wealthy woman (16:10-13).
á
Her fame, due to her
beauty and wealth, spreads far and wide (16:14).
á
She begins to trust in
her beauty and wealth, turning from her husband to become a prostitute,
lavishing his gifts on others and killing her own children (16:15-34).
á
Therefore, God is going
to bring disaster on her, using her former lovers to bring judgment, shame and
poverty, but this will not be fatal nor final (16:35-43).
á
Jerusalem is like her
mother, who despised her husband and children, and like her sisters, though she
herself is the worst of the lot (16:44-59).
á
But one day, God will
remember his covenant with her, and restore her, and make her sisters to be her
daughters (16:60-63).
What reason might we have to
think the genre of Genesis 2-3 is that of Ezekiel 16? On the positive side, we see an example of a narrative that
both resembles and is also quite different from the reality it is intended to
picture. That is what no-Adam
theistic evolutionists claim for Genesis 2-3 over against what really happened
in the origin and rebellion of mankind.
In both Ezekiel and Genesis an individual is used to represent a
collective identity, Jerusalem or mankind. We donÕt know enough of the history of Jerusalem to know how
to relate many of these features, but we know Jerusalem existed for centuries
between its birth and its adoption by God to be the capital city of
Israel. That, after it became
Israelite, it grew to be very wealthy in the time of David and Solomon, and its
inhabitants began to play up to the pagan nations around them and to adopt
their idolatrous practices. That,
by the time of Ezekiel, Jerusalem was in real trouble from the
Babylonians. That afterwards,
Jerusalem was conquered, devastated, and abandoned, only to be rebuilt in a
much more humble style long afterwards.
Some of the items seem to be predictions to be fulfilled at the end of
the age. Both Ezekiel and Genesis
use rather striking figures in the story to represent something different in
the reality. In Ezekiel, the
rescue of an abandoned child and her subsequent marriage is used to picture
GodÕs protection of pre-Israelite Jerusalem and his subsequent taking of the
city to be his capital. In
Genesis, the molding of clay and breathing into it is a vivid picture for GodÕs
guiding evolution to develop apes into humans. Much more of this sort of comparison could be developed, but
I will let proponents of this view do it themselves.
Negatively, there are
indicators in Ezekiel 16 that it is a parabolic narrative, indicators of the
sort we do not find in Genesis.
For instance, Ezk 16:2-3 says, ÒSon of man, confront Jerusalem with her detestable practices, and say, ÒThis is what
the sovereign LORD says to Jerusalem: Your ancestry and birth were in the land of the
Canaanites; your father was an
Amorite and your mother a
Hittite.Ó So the girl is clearly
labeled as a city. Her father and
mother are ethnic groups. Her
sisters are other cities. Clearly
we are in an allegory or parable.
In Genesis, we could take the
names of Adam and Eve as allegorical, but there are no explicit indicators that
we should do so. We do have the
man called Adam, which could be a
generic name, though it is not the common noun for man, Ish, but rather (apparently) a play on the fact that he
was made from the ground, adamah. The woman is called Òwoman,Ó Ishah, from her creation in 2:22 until she is named Eve (havah)
in 3:20, apparently a play on the word ÒlivingÓ (hay). These
could be allegorical names, but because we are looking at the origin of the
race and the first male and female in it, we should not expect them to have the
sort of distinctive names needed when there are many humans on earth. So the account might be an allegory or
it might not, but there are no explicit markers of allegory.
The Ezekiel narrative shifts
back and forth between literal features of Jerusalem and figurative features of
the story. The original readers
are assumed to be able to handle this because they know a good deal about the
history of the city. In Genesis,
by contrast, we donÕt know the Òreal storyÓ until it is discovered by modern
anthropologists, so the readers would be pretty much in the dark until now.
Could Ezekiel 16 be a model
for the genre of Genesis 2-3? I
think it could, but the warrant for reading it as such would have to come
almost totally from general revelation in nature. I do not think the scientific case for a gapless evolution
is strong enough to warrant our making the paradigm shift.
In recent years Howard Van
Till has proposed a version of pure theistic evolution (according to my chart,
page 6) which he labels Òfully gifted creation.Ó[18] Van Till has chosen this name for his
view because he emphasizes that everything needed to produce all the diversity
in creation (including the unique human abilities) is somehow built into the
created structure of particles and laws at the beginning, operating under the
purely providential guidance of God.
This is not imposed by supernatural, miraculous intervention at various
points along the way.
It seems to me this view
should be testable. Do we have
good reason to believe that nature contains the information necessary to
construct the complex structures we see in living things, especially in
humans? Where is it? In the DNA? But wouldnÕt it also be in the DNA of primitive organisms as
well? Could it be hidden in some
invisible law structure? It
doesnÕt look to me as though chaos theory, for example, is going to generate
the type of structure needed. Will
mutation and natural selection generate the information? My experience with computer modeling
(and BeheÕs experience with irreducible complexity) does not incline me to
think so.[19] I would say that at present, we do not
have evidence that nature contains the type of information necessary for these
structures, nor that they were inserted providentially (i.e., gradually) by
God. Thus Van TillÕs view is
currently a natural law of the gaps model, but of a theistic rather than
atheistic sort.
If Van Till is an orthodox
Christian, he does not deny the historicity of the miracles narrated in the
biblical account. In this sense
Van Till does not have a deistic world view, though some have accused him of
it. Yet Van Till does restrict
miracles to salvation history, removing them from the events of creation.[20] This is certainly a possible option,
though (given that the Bible does have miracles) it seems somewhat
arbitrary. One reason for choosing
this option is that creation is then fully gifted, rather than incomplete,
which certainly sounds like it gives God more credit for what he has done than
would postulating an incomplete creation in which God needs to intervene again
and again.
This reminds me of a statement by Fred Hoyle in his book Galaxies,
Nuclei and Quasars written back in
the sixties. In explaining why he
preferred his steady-state cosmology over the various varieties of the big-bang
model, Hoyle noted that the cosmological models he preferred were those in
which all the necessary features were built in from the beginning and arose
naturally from the laws, rather than having to have special adjustments like
his old post-war automobile did to keep it running.[21]
No doubt if we picture God as
a watchmaker and the universe as his watch, we would think his creation much
more elegant if it kept time without his having to open the back every few days
to make adjustments! But suppose
GodÕs creation is a violin he made on which to perform a concerto, and that
GodÕs interventions are crucial parts of his playing the music, like a series
of pizzicatos in the midst of regular bowing. We donÕt fault Stradivarius for not being a watchmaker.
Let us suppose with Van Till
that GodÕs miracles are restricted to salvation history. When did salvation history begin? With the fall of Adam and Eve? But Satan is clearly fallen before
then, and so presumably are the wicked angels. In fact, the creation account contains not a peep about the
creation of angels, a fact so glaring that the author of the ancient Jewish
pseudepigraphal book Jubilees felt constrained to put it in (on the first day).[22] My own guess (partly based on the
remark in Hebrews 9:11 about the heavenly tabernacle not being a part of this
creation) is that Satan was already fallen before God created our universe, and
that our creation is a part of GodÕs salvation work.
Whether or not creation is a
part of salvation history, Job 38:7 suggests that the angels were present at
the creation of the earth. Perhaps
the miracles in creation were intended for their benefit. Or they may have even been intended for
us moderns, who would begin to see scientific evidence for miraculous
intervention in creation in the twentieth century, at a time when the
historical reliability of the other biblical narratives containing miracles had
come under attack.
By the way, it does not seem
to me that any of the current Christian views of creation have done much with
the question of whether and how the angels may have been involved in GodÕs
creative work. This is nothing
that secular science is going to want to investigate, but Christians surely
should give the matter some thought.
Somewhat related to the
matter of creation models is the mind-body problem. Space forbids any extensive discussion of this matter, but a
few questions are in order. How
does the mind relate to the body?
Is the mind merely some sort of signal moving around in the hardware of
the brain? Or is the
mind/soul/spirit some sort of ghost in the machine? Is the brain, as Sir John Eccles suggested, a machine than
only a spirit can operate?[23] Is the theory that reduces the mind to
a signal the real science and the other theory only theology? If the mind is merely some
epiphenomenon that arises only when the brain is complex enough, what happens
to it when the brain dies? It
seems to me that there are serious problems here regarding the biblical
teaching of personal immortality, post-mortem survival, and the intermediate
state (existence of the person between death and resurrection). The choice between a monistic and a
dualistic view of human nature seems to me to have serious theological
consequences which Christian monists have not solved.[24]
The mind-body interaction is
also a paradigm for intelligent design.
As I see it, the intelligent design approach affirms that intelligence
is not reducible to either natural law or random (chaotic, chance)
phenomena. Unlike chance,
intelligence is not meaningless, but is characterized by purpose and goal. Unlike law, an intelligence can
initiate actions, and these actions are often ones which cannot be predicted.
Similarly it seems that the
mind-body interaction is to some extent a model for the interaction of God with
nature. Just as our unseen mind
controls the events of our visible body, so the unseen God controls visible
nature. As the unseen mind is (in
some limited sense) transcendent over the body, so God is (without limit)
transcendent over nature. There
are, of course, features in the mind-body interaction which do not correspond
to those in God-nature, but that is merely to say that we humans are made in
the image of God but are not gods ourselves.
Under scientific problems, we suggest the following. Transitional fossils are a problem for all versions of theistic evolution except those with rapid, guided transitions between the major biological categories. Irreducible complexity is problematic also, except (again) for versions which provide for rapid, guided transitions into these new structures characterized by such complexity. Theistic evolutionists tend to fill gaps with natural law (divine providence) rather than miracle (divine intervention). This is acceptable as a default position. Some criteria need to be developed as to when this default position should be abandoned in particular cases.
Among theological problems,
we suggest the following. The
account of human origins in Genesis 2, taken as a historical account rather
than myth or allegory, is a severe problem for all no-Adam versions of theistic
evolution, and a lesser problem for most versions of theistic evolution which
have a non-human ancestor for Adam.
The account of the origin of human sin and death in Genesis 3, taken as
a historical account rather than myth or allegory, is a severe problem for all
no-Adam versions of theistic evolution.
The warrant for reading Genesis 2 and 3 as myth or allegory comes from
outside Scripture, allegedly from the gapless nature of evolution. This is an
example of ÒGod of the gapsÓ thinking in which natural law is the gap
plugger. We should not mistake
research agendas for empirical results.
ÒOne who puts on his armor should not boast like one who takes it off Ó
(1 Kings 20:11). The desire to
have a non-interventionist origin of humanity leads naturally to a monistic
view of human nature, raising severe problems for post-mortem survival, a
doctrine clearly taught in Scripture.
[1]. Robert
C. Newman, ÒCreationism,Ó in Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism. Ed.
Brenda E. Brasher (New York: Routledge, 2001). ASA statement on creation:
http://www.asa3.org/ASA/topics/Evolution/commission_on_creation.html#Commission%20on%20Creation.
[2]. Keith
Stewart Thomson ÒThe meanings of evolution,Ó American Scientist 70 (Sept-Oct 1982): 529-531
[3]. Ibid.,
p. 529.
[4]. Ibid.
[5]. E.g.,
Dudley J. Whitney, Harold W. Clark, Frank Lewis Marsh, H. Douglas Dean,
mentioned in Ronald L. Numbers, The Creationists (New York: Knopf, 1992), pp. 109, 124, 131-2, 234.
[6].
Thomson, ÒMeanings of evolution,Ó p. 529.
[7]. Ibid.
[8]. Ibid.
[9]. Ibid.
[10].
Ibid. My numbers added in
brackets.
[11]. E.g.,
Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, Evolution from Space (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), chaps. 3-4; Francis
Crick, Life Itself: Its Origin and Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), chap. 13.
[12]. E.g.,
G. A. Kerkut, Implications of Evolution (London: Pergamon, 1960), chap. 2.
[15]. Michael
Behe, DarwinÕs Black Box (New
York: Free Press, 1996).
[16]. William
A. Dembski, Intelligent Design
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity,
1999), chaps. 5-6; Behe, DarwinÕs Black Box, chaps. 9-10.
[17]. Glenn R. Morton, Foundation, Fall and Flood: A Harmonization of Genesis and Science (published 1995 by author, 16075 Longvista Dr.,
Dallas, TX 75248), p. 247.
[18]. Howard
Van Till, ÒThe Fully Gifted Creation,Ó in Three Views on Creation and Evolution, ed. J. P. Moreland and John Mark Reynolds (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), pp.
161-218, esp. pp. 184-190.
[19]. Robert
C. Newman, ÒSelf-Reproducing Automata and the Origin of Life, Perspectives
on Science and Christian Faith 40
(March 1988): 24-31; ÒArtificial Life and Cellular AutomataÓ in Mere
Creation: Science, Faith &
Intelligent Design, ed. William A.
Dembski (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity, 1998), pp. 427-445.
[20]. Van
Till, ÒFully Gifted Creation,Ó p. 187, defines miracle as Òan extraordinary act
of God performed in the presence of human observers for some specific
revelatory or redemptive purpose.Ó
[21]. Fred
Hoyle, Galaxies, Nuclei and Quasars
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
p. 96.
[22]. See
Jubilees 2:2 on the creation of angels on the first day.
[23]. See
John C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (Berlin, etc.:
Springer-Verlag, 1994); Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self
and Its Brain (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
[24]. See
John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1989) for an excellent discussion of these matters.